Avsnitt
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A 74-year-old port magnate known in the underworld as Antikvar is arrested by an FSB team, hauled into Moscow’s Basmanny Court, and suddenly the ghosts of St Petersburg’s wild 1990s feel very alive. Ilya Traber's career took him from from antiques monopolies to oil terminals, in the murky interface between “authoritative business” and outright organised crime. And much of it thanks to his relationship with Putin in and since the 1990s.
Traber's name has run through the bloody annals of 'Banditsky Peterbug,' so why act now? My theory: he overstepped the bounds of the new rules, at a time when serious figures within the FSB, including First Deputy Director Korolev, had reason to go after him.But this would have come to nothing had Traber's old partner Putin not given the green light. When the decision is made at the top, even yesterday’s “untouchables” can become expendable.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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Peace gets talked about as if it is a destination we can spot from the front line, but the closer we look, the more it feels like a mirage. Ukraine’s mid-range strikes and tactical gains tempt commentators into declaring a decisive shift, and then into assuming peace is near. Real progress matters, but overconfident stories can set the public up for disappointment and push policymakers towards shortcuts.
I take an article by British ex-diplomat Ian Proud on what he thinks a peace would require - I agree with many of his diagnoses, but not with a lot of his prescriptions - as a starting point to explore the different moving parts within any peace process. I don't end up feeling especially optimistic, although Russia could still just stop fighting at any time.
The Proud article, by the way, is here: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-russia-europe-talks/
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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Saknas det avsnitt?
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Russia still talks about the “Near Abroad” as if the map never changed, but the region is changing anyway. After a quick touch on Zelensky's open letter to Putin and the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, I dive into the relative trajectories of Armenia, currently at the polls, and Belarus, emphatically not. Despite its continued use of this problematic, imperialist term the "Near Abroad," in different ways, Moscow’ is finding its influence fraying across the former Soviet space, and why the Kremlin is leaning harder on pressure, deniability, and narrative spin to compensate for a shrinking sphere of influence.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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A Russian drone hits a Romanian apartment block, two civilians are injured, and suddenly a stray weapon becomes a case study in how Putin’s Kremlin handles bad news. Why does the Kremlin’s crisis management default to a belligerent, self-sabotaging sequence that turns a manageable incident into a wider political problem?
It comes down to the priorities of an insecure, personalistic authoritarian system that equates any admission of failure with weakness, that regards information as a battlefield, and which lacks institutional filters between personality and policy.
Details of the 23 June event in Potsdam I mentioned are:https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/marc-galeotti-autocracy-vs-technocracy-explaining-ukraine-war-6107930
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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After Putin's Beijing visit - long on rhetoric, short on results - I look more broadly as Asia: the limits of the "friendship with no limits" with China, heding with India, and the ebbing of hegemony in Central Asia. In short, everyone is a transactional pragmatist, behind the talk of "all-weather partnerships" and "eternal friendships." But then again, isn't everyone everwhere, these days?
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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First, a round up of some current issues: Putin heading to China, two governors out (and two men with Ukraine war connections in), party politics and the jostling for second place, and how the Council of Europe is implicitly encouraging Putin to stay in power until he dies...
In the second half, the opening episode of a series of alternative history (the rest will be available to paying Patrons) exploring some of the great what-ifs. This time, what if Kyiv had surrendered to the Mongols in 1240 and never lost its pre-eminence? Following that single fork in the road leads to a different centre of gravity, different institutions, and maybe even a world where “Ukraine” never emerges in the way we know it.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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No tanks, great camera work. Victory Day is supposed to be Russia’s most unshakeable story, the moment when the state proves its strength, its allies, and its confidence on Red Square. Yet watching this year’s parade, I can’t escape the sense that the symbolism is working harder than the reality: fewer troops, no heavy hardware in Moscow, and security concerns hanging over the whole performance.
In the rest of the podcast, I look at a leaked report on spinning peace and wonder if it part of an attempt to lobby Putin indirectly, the appointment of a new commander of Aerospace Forces, Colonel General Chaiko, and that (to me, pretty dodgy) 'European intelligence report' that has caused such a storm.
The bigger point is simple and uncomfortable: disinformation and psychological warfare are part of how this conflict is fought, and they thrive on our appetite for certainty.
The Kyiv Independent report I mentioned is here.The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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A battlefield setback in Mali sparks a much bigger question: what kind of power is Russia now, and what kind of power can it afford to be? Is it a superpower? No. Is it a great power? It depends what you mean. It certainly is not just the "gas station with nukes" of the cliche.
Putin’s language of “sovereign civilisation” recasts greatness as resistance rather than dominance, especially as Victory Day messaging leans on endurance. I argue Russia is a middle power that can pivot, triangulate and sometimes punch above its weight without shaping the world order.
That's no bad thing. Russia (and Putin) are not "failures" as some would suggest, even if they have by no means hit their grand, aspirational goals. Russia would be a lot happier if it accepted this status but for Putin and his Homo Sovieticus peers, alas, this is not enough - and that is what has lead us all to the present unhappy place.
The article I mentioned from The i Paper is here, and the Deutsche Welle video is here.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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Putin didn’t pick a battlefield hero to run Russia’s Defence Ministry. He picked Andrei Belousov, an economist with a planner’s instincts and a technocrat’s patience. Thats what the Kremlin thinks it needs most right now: a 'Quartermaster-in-Chief,' who wouldn't tangle with Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov, but instead focus in procurement that works, production at scale, drones that reach units fast, and a defence industrial complex that can keep up with an ugly, grinding war economy.
He is satisfying Putin, the generals and society -- for now. But his legitimacy depends on results, he is boxed in by a team of deputies representing other factions and interests, and in many ways the real tests begin when the war ends.The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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The fastest way to lose your grip on Russia is to reach for the word “war” every time a scary headline lands. The incentives are everywhere: politicians who want public backing for big defence spending, media outlets that live on attention, and all of us who share first and think later.
I look at two particular examples: the current fascination in the British press with the idea that Russia may launch an attack using long-range missiles, and a truly insane essay by Konstantin Malofeyev in his Tsargrad media outlet fantasising about a tactical nuclear strike to end the Ukraine war.
The British article is here, the Russian one here.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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Power doesn’t just seize territory. It seizes the story. I’m using a selection of 6 excellent new books to follow the narrative battlegrounds where modern Russia tries to control what people see as true, normal, and inevitable, and where society still finds ways to push back even when formal protest is risky, whether in framing Harry Potter, or surviving in the occupied Donbas.
The books in question are:
Alexis Lerner, Post-Soviet Graffiti. Free Speech in Authoritarian States (University of Toronto Press, 2025) - see also her Eurasian Knot podcast interview here.Michael Gorham, Networking Putinism. The rhetoric of power in the digital age (Cornell University Press, 2026)Eliot Borenstein,The Politics of Fantasy. Magic, Children’s Literature and Fandom in Putin's Russia (University of Wisconsin Press, 2025). Greta Lynn Uehling, Everyday War: The Conflict Over Donbas, Ukraine (Cornell University Press, 2023)David Lewis, Occupation. Russian Rule in Southeastern Ukraine (Hurst, 2025) Martin Laryš, Rebel Militias in Eastern Ukraine, from leaderless groups to proxy armies (Routledge, 2025).Details of the Times event on 7 May I mentioned are here.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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Putin reportedly gathered top oligarchs behind closed doors and asked them to chip in to help fill the budget, with the war in Ukraine sitting unmistakably in the background. The idea seems to have been initiated by Igor Sechin, Rosneft’s gravel-voiced boss and one of the most polarising figures in Putin’s circle. After keeping a low profile since 2022, why is he coming back into the news? Because of the 'Prigozhin Syndrome': if you are a crony, not a friend, if you want something from the boss, you also need to demonstrate your utility.
That early podcast from 2022, by the way, In Moscow's Shadows 2: Mishustin, Sechin, Institutional vs Personal Power, is here.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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A handful of memes and an online storm can look like nothing, right up until they start steering the news cycle. Efforts to talk up a secessionist Russian-speaking Estonian “Narva People’s Republic” look like a Kremlin disruption operation: manufacturing attention, stoking anxiety, and forcing journalists and officials into a no-win choice between silence and amplification.
Rather more significant is the case of St Petersburg lawyer and Kremlin-friendly smear merchant, Ilya Remeslo, who has abruptly posted “Five Reasons Why I Stopped Supporting Vladimir Putin”, and then reportedly ended up in a psychiatric ward. A genuine conversion, a breakdown, a trap to catch dissidents, a pretext to shut down Telegram amid internet restrictions, or a very old-fashioned quest for money and status?
Maybe the regime really is under a kind of threat, not from a coup, but a slower, messier dissolution: elite resource fights, regional pushback over internet outages, war weariness, nationalist critiques from different directions. Russian political life is not dead, merely defrosting.Details of the event at the University of Chester on 16 April are here.
You can find details of my books, in English and translation, at my In Moscow's Shadows blog page, here.
Tom Adshead's New Kremlinology substack is here.
And if you want to know more about Russians With Attitude, look here.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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Or, 'Team Russia and the Undead Ideology Project'
Can you create an ideology that is custom-engineered, poll-driven, focus grouped, workshopped and marketed? The Presidential Administration's Alexander Kharichev is certainly trying, suggesting the Kremlin's concerns about the future.
I also discuss Marlene Laruelle's excellent book Ideology and Meaning-Making under the Putin Regime (Stanford UP 2025), and the link to Jeremy Morris's comments on it is here.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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How does the Iran war look to Russia, at once a potential morass for the USA (and Europe) and a case study, many in policy circles feel, on why not to trust Washington. It's also a laboratory for what one Russian military theorist called "non-contact war," and may help shape Moscow's notions of the future of conflict.
Then it’s home to Moscow’s underworld, where a fragile peace holds between Shakro Molodoi and Badri Kutaissky, while younger “thieves‑in‑law” turn old grudges into proxy fights. One death, one arrest, or a shock from Chechnya could snap the stalemate and pull the state into an ugly arbitration it can neither control nor ignore.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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First, as the USA, Israel and Iran trade drone and missile strikes, how the war may play out for Russia: my sense is that on balance it will give Moscow more opportunities than headaches.
Then, from bangers to Mish: decoding Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s annual report to the State Duma. Think of a head butler in a grand house: no say in the party upstairs, every burden downstairs. The technocrats may plan to edge Russia from “gas station” to “supermarket,” but is this viable?
The Sunday Times article I mention is here, Ben Aris's BNE Intellinews piece here, and the signup page for Thursday's crisis exercise here.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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A frozen river swallows cannons in 1550; a traffic jam of armour stalls outside Kyiv in 2022. Different centuries, same lesson: wars are won by planning, logistics, and the courage to listen to people who know what they’re doing. Ivan the Terrible took Kazan in 1552, learning crucial lessons of warfare and statecraft that Putin the Not So Great neglected when invading Ukraine in 2022.
Spinning off my new book, Siege of Kazan 1552: Ivan the Terrible breaks the Kazan khanate (Osprey), I look at how that campaign showed the power of five disciplines: promote competence, raise the right army for the fight, plan supply first, empower specialists, and build morale on a story that endures contact with reality. And how the Ukraine was has shown the cost of neglecting them. The war will change Russia—its economy, its veterans, its ties to Europe—just as Kazan changed Muscovy. The only open question is whether leaders choose the lessons that build a state, or the myths that break one.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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In the first half, I look at the latest news about Navalny's death, what a change in the composition of the Russian negotiation team in Geneva may mean, and why looking for a dubious Russian connection in the Epstein case risks missing the real scandal: how powerful people and institutions tolerated what they knew.
Then, to answer the larger question—what kind of country is Russia?—I spin off two books: a long view of survey data that charts a hybrid regime’s rise and fracture after 2014, and a cultural study that sees Russia as fluid, formed by global flows rather than failing toward someone else’s model. Putin’s project tries to bank the gains of global capitalism while fencing off its social and political shocks. That balancing act is faltering. Deglobalising Russia has become both strategy and trap.
But arguably Russia isn’t an aberration; it’s an early case of how globalisation scrambles identity, power, and legitimacy. From Brexit to big tech, we’re all negotiating the same tides—just with different weather.The books are Paul Chaisty & Stephen Whitefield’s How Russians Understand the New Russia (Princeton UP, 2025), and Vera Michlin-Shapir’s Fluid Russia: between the global and the national in the post-Soviet era (Cornell UP, 2021).
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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A mini-episode that paying Patrons heard as part of their Twelve Days of Shadowy Christmas bonuses. Forget the cliché that Russians accept power without protest, I sit down with author and analyst Anna Arutunyan to unpack a more complicated truth from her book Rebel Russia: Russia’s past is full of uprisings and dissent, yet weak social solidarity keeps those bursts of courage from becoming lasting institutions. When no stable forums exist for bargaining between citizens and the state, pressure builds, revolutions erupt, and the reset button gets slammed—often wiping out the very spaces needed for democracy to grow.
The book, Rebel Russia: Dissent and Protest from the Tsars to Navalny, was published last year by Polity Press, in both hardback and e-book formats.The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
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Yes, that's a lame James Bond title wordplay. Lieutenant General Vladimir Alexeyev, second in command of Russian military intelligence (technically, GU; colloquially, still GRU) is gunned down in Moscow. Whodunnit, whydunnit, and what will it mean? Of course, I don't know, but I have a stab at these questions.
The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.
You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.Support the show
- Visa fler
